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EQUATING A STEPPARENT'S RIGHTS AND
LIABILITIES VIS-A-VIS CUSTODY VISITATION AND
SUPPORT UPON DISSOLUTION OF THE MARRIAGE
WITH THOSE OF THE NATURAL PARENT-AN
EQUITABLE SOLUTION TO A GROWING DILEMMA?
MARY E. WRIGHT-HUNT*
INTRODUCTION
Today, it is widely known and accepted that one half of all marriages
end in divorce. Of lesser renown, however, is the fact that the high rate
of divorce has been accompanied by a correspondingly high rate of re-
marriage. It is these remarriages that are, in large part, responsible for
the more than thirty five million stepparents in the United States today.1
Moreover, it has been estimated that thirteen hundred new step families
are blended each day.2
The typical "blended family" which will be the focus of this article is
one in which there exists at least one stepparent and one or more chil-
dren of a previous marriage. When the "blended family" comes to-
gether, it creates a unique set of problems ranging from hostilities toward
the new stepparent and resentment towards new siblings to strained rela-
tions between ex-spouses and the cessation of support and visitation by
the noncustodial spouse. Against this type of setting, the new stepparent
is often required to make an emotional as well as a financial commitment
in an effort to make the relationship work. Notwithstanding such com-
mitments, however, the survival rate for remarriages is only slightly bet-
ter than that for first time marriages with over forty-eight percent of all
remarriages ending in divorce.' Moreover, upon the dissolution of the
marriage, the stepparent often finds himself in a contest with the natural
parent over custody and visitation rights with the stepchild and support
liabilities toward the child.
In the past, the rights and liabilities of the stepparent vis-a-vis custody,
visitation and support issues were fairly well settled. At common law,
the stepparent incurred no liabilities of support towards a stepchild and
* B.A. 1973, University of North Carolina at Greensboro; J.D. 1976, George Washington
University; Associate Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University.
1. White, His, Hers and Theirs, The Atlanta Constitution, April 17, 1985, at Cl, col. 5.
2. Id.
3. Id. at C4, col. 5.
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likewise acquired no rights of custody or visitation.4 Today, however,
with the ever increasing numbers of "blended families," issues of the
rights and liabilities of stepparents are being raised with greater fre-
quency. Correspondingly, the judicial and legislative responses have re-
sulted in a gradual erosion of the common law status of the stepparent in
relation to the stepchild. Although there has not been an absolute equa-
tion of the rights and liabilities of the stepparent with those of the natural
parent, the trend is moving closer to placing the stepparent on a more
equal footing with the natural parent.
This article will examine whether, and under what circumstances, the
rights and liabilities of stepparents regarding custody, visitation, and sup-
port could justifiably be equated with those of the natural parent. In so
doing, the focus will be on the manner in which such established doc-
trines as in loco parentis, equitable estoppel, and newer doctrines such as
"best interest of the child" and "psychological parentage" can effectively
be utilized to support an equalization of the rights and liabilities of step-
parents and natural parents toward children of a "blended family."
IMPOSITION OF SUPPORT
A. During the Marriage
At common law, the stepparent and stepchild relationship conferred
no rights and imposed no obligations.' Consequently, a stepparent at
common law had no duty to support a stepchild, either during the mar-
riage or upon its termination. A few states, however, statutorily imposed
a duty of support on the stepparent.6 Moreover, where such duties were
not imposed by statute because of the stepparent status, they were often
statutorily7 or judicially8 imposed under the doctrine of in loco parentis.
This doctrine essentially provides that one who has assumed the status
and obligation of a natural parent without formal adoption stands in the
4. See generally Miller v. United States, 123 F.2d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1941); Exparte Flynn, 87
N.J. Eq. 413, 416, 100 A. 861, 863 (N.J. Ch. 1917).
5. E.g., In re Smith's Estate, 49 Wash. 2d 229, 231, 299 P.2d 550, 551 (1956).
6. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:l(IV) (1974) ("child" for purposes of imposing support
liabilities is defined as either a natural child, adopted child, or stepchild); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
45-4.1 (Supp. 1986) ("A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same extent that a natural or
adoptive parent is required to support a child."). Other states only impose the support obligation on
the stepparent where the stepchild would otherwise become a public charge. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 101(1) (McKinney 1986) ("Except as otherwise provided by law, the spouse or parent
of a recipient of public assistance... [is] responsible for the support of such person .... Stepparents
shall in like manner be responsible for the support of stepchildren under the age of twenty-one
years.").
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(b) (1984) ("In the absence of pleading and proof that the cir-
cumstances otherwise warrant, the father and mother shall be primarily liable for the support of the
minor child, and any other person ... standing in loco parentis shall be secondarily liable for such
support.").
8. Taylor v. Taylor, 58 Wash. 2d 510, 513, 364 P.2d 444, 445 (1961).
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place of the natural parent.9
While it is generally accepted that a stepparent does not stand in loco
parentis with the child merely by virtue of his status as such, where the
stepparent voluntarily assumes obligations towards the child incidental
to the parental relation, he incurs liabilities that have been described as
being the same as those of the natural parent.1° The circumstances under
which one can come to acquire the status of in loco parentis were aptly
described in Trotter v. Ashbaugh." There the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that a person who assumes the relationship of a parent to a child,
whom he is under no obligation to support, and discharges the duties of
that relationship by receiving such child into his family and educating
and supporting the child as if the child had been his own, is in a position
of in loco parentis with the child.12
In the past, where an obligation of support was imposed on a steppar-
ent, either statutorily or by way of the in loco parentis doctrine, the obli-
gation was routinely terminated upon the dissolution of the marriage. 3
This was based in large part on the recognition that because the in loco
parentis status was voluntarily created, it could be terminated at will by
either the stepchild or the stepparent. In the context of a divorce in
which the stepparent was denying support liabilities towards the child, it
was generally assumed that the stepparent had no desire to continue the
in loco parentis relationship with the child beyond the dissolution of
the marriage. 4 Thus, the relationship was considered voluntarily
terminated.
B. Continuation of Support Liability Beyond the Marriage
Notwithstanding the generally held view that obligations of support
are imposed upon the stepparent only for the duration of the marriage, a
number of courts have found ways to impose support obligations on step-
parents that extend beyond the dissolution of the marriage. However, an
examination of the decisions that have imposed support obligations on
the stepparent extending beyond the marriage reveals a substantially sim-
ilar fact pattern. The overwhelming majority of those cases involved sit-
uations in which the natural mother was pregnant with someone else's
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979).
10. See Brummit v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Ky. 1962); Dodson v. McAdams, 96
N.C. 149, 155, 2 S.E. 453, 454 (1887).
11. 156 Ga. App. 130, 274 S.E.2d 127 (1980).
12. Id. at 131, 132, 274 S.E.2d at 129.
13. E.g., McDowell v. McDowell, 378 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Ky. 1964); Eckhardt v. Eckhardt, 37
A.D.2d 629, 323 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 (Supp. 1986).
14. See, eg., Franklin v. Franklin, 75 Ariz. 151, 156, 253 P.2d 337, 340 (1953); Wood v. Wood,
166 Ga. 519, 519-20, 143 S.E. 770, 773 (1928); Taylor v. Taylor, 58 Wash. 2d 510, 512, 364 P.2d
444, 445 (1961).
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child at the time of her marriage to the stepfather.15 The stepfather, who
was aware of the circumstances, would more often than not promise to
care for the child as if the child were his own and in fact did so for the
duration of the marriage. In many of the cases, because the child was
born just prior to the marriage or shortly thereafter, the child would
grow up believing that the stepfather was his natural father. As a result
of the stepfather's voluntary assumption of the care and support of the
child and his acceptance of the child as his own, the mother would rou-
tinely allege that the stepfather stood in loco parentis with the child and
this allegation was more often than not accepted by the court.1
6
Although the mother had little difficulty establishing an in loco paren-
tis status, the courts were compelled to look beyond the in loco parentis
doctrine where they sought to impose support liabilities upon the step-
parent that would continue beyond the dissolution of the marriage. In so
doing, the two most practical solutions were the doctrines of implied
contract and equitable estoppel. The prerequisites for the application of
the latter doctrine were discussed at length in an early California deci-
sion, Clevenger v. Clevenger.7 In Clevenger, although the stepfather had
accepted the child into the family from the child's birth, it was not estab-
lished that he had ever represented himself as the child's natural father.
On this basis, the California Court of Appeal held that the stepfather was
not estopped from denying his liability for support. The court, nonethe-
less, approved, in principle, the imposition of support upon a stepparent
provided certain prerequisites were met:
If the facts should show... that the husband represented to the boy that
he was his father, that the husband intended that his representation be
accepted and acted upon by the child, that the child relied upon the rep-
resentation and treated the husband as his father and gave his love and
affection to him, that the child was ignorant of the true facts, we would
have the foundation of the elements of estoppel ....
Based on the foregoing, it would appear that in Clevenger, and the
subsequent cases which cited Clevenger with approval, the pivotal ques-
tion was whether the stepfather had actually held himself out to be the
natural father of the child. Thus, while the general acceptance of the
child into the family unit was held to be sufficient to create the in loco
15. See, eg., In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 849-50, 152 Cal. Rptr. 121, 122
(1979) (child was born 10 days before marriage of mother to stepfather); Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d
767, 768 (D.C. 1968) (child was born three months after mother's marriage to stepfather); Miller v.
Anderson, 43 Ohio St. 473, 3 N.E. 605 (1885) (child was born three months after marriage of mother
to stepfather).
16. See, eg., Fuller, 247 A.2d at 770; State v. Shoemaker, 62 Iowa 343, 17 N.W. 589 (1883);
Hartford v. Hartford, 53 Ohio App. 2d 79, 86, 371 N.E.2d 591, 596 (1977).
17. 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1961).
18. Id. at 671, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
4
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 [1988], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol17/iss1/3
EQUATING STEPPARENT'S RIGHTS
parentis status, 19 this was not enough to carry liability beyond the mar-
riage. Before liability extended beyond the marriage it was necessary to
establish that the stepfather took the additional action of holding himself
out as the natural father of the child. 0 It was this act that was said to
induce the requisite reliance by the child so as to warrant an application
of equitable estoppel.
C. Extension to "'Blended Families"
Although cases such as Clevenger laid the foundation for the extension
of the support obligation beyond the dissolution of the marriage, their
impact on the "blended family" had, until recently, been minimized by
the narrowly drawn fact patterns of those decisions.21 Unlike the situa-
tion in Clevenger, the typical "blended family" presents a situation where
the child has had substantial contact with his natural parent and is aware
that the stepparent is not his natural parent. Thus, to the extent that the
application of equitable estoppel in the Clevenger line of cases was depen-
dent upon a finding that the stepparent had held himself out as the
child's natural parent, and the child had relied upon this representation
to his detriment, the stepparent in the typical "blended family" would
seemingly not be in as vulnerable a position. While the stepparent may
treat the child as if he were the stepparent's natural child, it is much less
likely that the stepparent would hold himself out as the natural parent of
the stepchild and the stepchild, likewise, would not generally look upon
the stepparent as his natural parent.
In spite of these dissimilarities, however, the New Jersey Supreme
Court recently relied upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel to impose a
continuing duty of support on a stepfather in a "blended family." Miller
v. Miller22 represents a significant departure from the Clevenger line of
cases in several respects. To begin with, the stepchildren in Miller were
not born into the marriage between the stepparent, Miller, and their nat-
ural parent as was typical in the Clevenger type cases. In addition, the
two girls had substantial contact with their natural father prior to their
mother's marriage to Miller and were aware that Miller was not their
natural father. Even more importantly, Miller never held himself out as
the girls' natural father. Notwithstanding the obvious differences be-
tween Miller and the Clevenger line of cases, the court held that Miller
would be estopped from denying his obligation to support his stepdaugh-
ters, thereby imposing upon Miller an obligation of support that contin-
19. See, eg., Fuller, 247 A.2d at 770; Taylor, 58 Wash. 2d at 514, 364 P.2d at 445.
20. See generally Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d at 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 707; L. v.
L., 497 S.W.2d 840 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
21. L., 497 S.W.2d at 840; Ross v. Ross, 126 N.J. Super. 394, 314 A.2d 623 (1973); T. v. T., 216
Va. 867, 224 S.E.2d 148 (1976).
22. 97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351 (1984).
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ued beyond the dissolution of the marriage.2" In so doing, the court
relied on evidence that Miller had actively interfered with the relation-
ship between the girls and their natural father, to the point of refusing to
allow the girls to visit their natural father or accept any support from
him. Instead, Miller voluntarily assumed responsibility for the support
of his stepdaughters and claimed them as dependents on his income tax
return. Although the girls' natural father refused to consent to their
adoption by Miller, they used Miller's surname on their school records
with Miller's knowledge and consent.
The court concluded that as a result of Miller's conduct, he stood in
loco parentis with his two stepdaughters. The court then noted that
while in loco parentis status generally terminates upon the dissolution of
the marriage, in appropriate cases, the stepparent can be estopped from
denying an obligation to support the stepchild.24 Since Miller had in-
duced the girls to rely on him to their emotional and financial detriment,
the court decided this was an appropriate case for the application of equi-
table estoppel, even though Miller had not held himself out to be the
girls' father.
D. Towards Equalization of Support Liability
Although the extent to which other jurisdictions may adopt the Miller
reasoning remains to be seen, Miller could have significant implications
for the stepparent in the "blended family." This is readily apparent from
Miller's deviation from the earlier line of decisions. It is clear, for exam-
ple, that the emphasis in Miller was away from a finding that the steppar-
ent held himself out as the child's natural parent and towards a finding
that the stepparent's interference with the relationship between the child
and the noncustodial natural parent had impaired the ability of the child
to receive support from that parent.2 5
Although Miller's shift in emphasis could seemingly be viewed by the
courts as a willingness to broaden the circumstances under which a step-
parent might incur ongoing support liabilities, at least one court appears
to have given Miller a narrow reading in this respect. In Wiese v.
Wiese,26 the Supreme Court of Utah, citing Miller with approval, found
that while the stepfather had supported the child and had treated the
child as his own, the prerequisites for the application of equitable estop-
pel had not been met since there was no evidence that the stepfather had
interfered with the relationship between the child and his natural fa-
23. Id. at 170, 478 A.2d at 359.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 168-69, 478 A.2d at 358.
26. 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985).
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ther.27 It should also be noted that the court in Miller proceeded cau-
tiously as well, by carefully explaining that before the stepparent
becomes liable for pendente lite support, the natural parent must show
that he is not receiving support from the noncustodial natural parent and
that support cannot be obtained from that individual.28 In addition, in
order to receive permanent support from the stepparent, the natural par-
ent must show that there were representations by the stepparent which
were relied upon to the detriment of the natural parent and child.2 9
Though the court in Miller emphasized that the primary obligation of
support remains with the natural parent, Miller is indicative of the ever
narrowing legal distinctions between the natural parent and the steppar-
ent.30 The move in this direction would appear to be based largely on a
concern for the stepchild's welfare."1 Long before the Miller decision,
the importance of facilitating the integration of the stepchild into the
family unit by equalizing the rights of the stepchild with those of the
natural child had been recognized.32 It is not uncommon, for example,
to find dependency statutes in which children who are deemed to be de-
pendent are defined as including stepchildren.33 Where stepchildren are
not expressly included within such statutes, they are often held to qualify
for benefits if it is determined that they are or were in fact dependent
upon the stepparent.34
The corollary to equating the rights of the stepchild with those of the
natural child is the imposition of liabilities upon the stepparent equaling
those of the natural parent. This trend towards equalization is further
aided by the difficulties associated with obtaining support from an absen-
27. Id. at 702-03.
28. Miller, 97 N.J. at 167, 478 A.2d at 358.
29. Id. at 168, 478 A.2d at 358.
30. See generally Archibald v. Whaland, 555 F.2d 1061, 1067 (1st Cir. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 546-A:l(IV) (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 (Supp. 1986). But see Mahoney, Support
and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 38, 45-49 (1984)
(author discusses at length various arguments presented in opposition to imposing support liabilities
on stepparents).
31. Miller, 97 N.J. at 171-78, 478 A.2d at 360-63 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
32. See Berkowitz, Legal Incidents of Today's "Step" Relationship: Cinderella Revisited, 4
FAM. L.Q. 209, 228 (1970) (author advocates the assumption by the stepfather of all obligations and
a phasing out of the involvement of the natural father in order to facilitate the stepchild's adjustment
to the new family); see also State v. Gillaspie, 8 Wash. App. 560, 562, 507 P.2d 1223, 1224 (1973)
(stating that the law has been developing toward the integration of stepchildren into the family with
rights equal to those of natural children).
33. "Child" is defined in some states' workers compensation acts to include stepchild. GA.
CODE ANN. § 34-9-13(a)(1) (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-19(f) (West 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-2(12) (1985).
34. See, eg., Cherokee Brick Co. v. Bishop, 156 Tenn. 168, 299 S.W. 770 (1927) (holding that a
stepchild who is a member of the employee's family and is dependent upon the employee for support
is a dependent child within the ambit of protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act and is
entitled to share benefits equally with an actual child of the deceased employee).
7
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tee natural parent. Given the growing concern with the inadequacies of
existing support measures, it is probable that courts will begin to look
increasingly towards the stepparent as an alternative or as an additional
source of support. While stepparents do not yet have support liabilities
toward a stepchild equaling those of the natural parent, the courts have
consistently stated that persons who stand in loco parentis to a child have
the same rights and obligations as those of the natural parents.3 5
Based on the equation of the rights and liabilities of one who stands in
loco parentis with a child to those of a natural parent, one could argue
that upon the establishment of the in loco parentis status, there should be
no distinction between the support obligations of the stepparent and the
natural parent. While this status normally terminates upon dissolution
of the marriage, it has been effectively extended beyond the marriage
through the application of equitable estoppel. Thus, given the judicial
concern with equalizing the rights of stepchildren with those of natural
children in the family unit and increasing the probability that all children
with absentee parents will receive adequate support, it appears likely that
the support liabilities of the stepparent will continue to move closer to
those of the natural parent.
CUSTODIAL ISSUES
A. Procedural Barriers
The custody disputes between a natural parent and a stepparent liti-
gated to date tend to fall into one of two categories. The first category
consists of a dispute between a noncustodial natural parent and a step-
parent with whom the minor child has been living as a result of that
stepparent's marriage to the custodial natural parent. A dispute gener-
ally arises within this context when the noncustodial parent's attempt to
gain legal custody of the child upon the death of the custodial parent is
opposed by the stepparent with whom the child has been residing. The
second category consists of a dispute between the custodial natural par-
ent and the stepparent for custody of the minor child upon the dissolu-
tion of their marriage. While most of the reported cases to date have
fallen into the former category, the stepparent, whether in a contest with
the custodial natural parent or the noncustodial natural parent, faces an
uphill battle in his attempt to gain custody of the child as against the
natural parent. The factor which weighs most heavily against the step-
parent is the historically recognized right of a natural parent to the cus-
35. Austin v. Austin, 147 Neb. 109, 112-13, 22 N.W.2d 560, 563 (1946) (emphasis added); see
also Sparks v. Hinckley, 78 Utah 502, 506, 5 P.2d 570, 571-72 (1931) ("where one stands in loco
parentis to another, the rights and liabilities arising out of that relation are, as the words imply,
exactly the same as between parent and child"). But see Berkowitz, supra note 32, at 215.
8
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tody of his child as against third parties.36 Moreover, the stepparent may
be faced with procedural barriers as well.37
One such procedural barrier stems from basic statutory construction.
In many instances, the natural parent and the stepparent will be proceed-
ing under a statute which provides that the court may award custody of
"children of the marriage."3  Some courts have reasoned that a stepchild
is not a child "of the marriage" within the meaning of such a statute.
The courts have then held that they lacked the authority to make an
award of custody in a dispute between the natural parent and the step-
parent.39 Other courts, when presented with this issue have reached a
contrary result. In one case where the statute provided that upon di-
vorce the court has the authority to make provision for "minor children
of the marriage,"' the natural father argued that this phrase did not
include children of a former marriage and the court thus lacked author-
ity to make an award of custody to the stepmother. The Kansas
Supreme Court, in rejecting the father's argument, relied on an earlier
decision in which a stepmother had been allowed to proceed under such
a statute. There the child had been brought into the home and the step-
mother who had assumed its care stood in loco parentis with the child.
The court therefore reasoned that the phrase "minor children of the mar-
riage" could be fairly interpreted to include the child in question.41
B. Impact of the "Parental Rights" Doctrine
Even where the stepparent successfully defends against such proce-
dural challenges, he faces an even greater obstacle once the court reaches
the merits of the case. Absent extraordinary circumstances, courts his-
36. Pape v. Pape, 444 So. 2d 1058, 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Childs v. Childs, 237 Ga.
177, 178, 227 S.E.2d 49, 50 (1976); Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis. 2d 549, 568-69, 348 N.W.2d 479,
483 (1984).
37. See, eg., Anderson v. Anderson, 191 Kan. 76, 78-79, 379 P.2d 348, 350 (1963); Pierce v.
Pierce, 198 Mont. 255, 261, 645 P.2d 1353, 1356-57 (1982) (Absent the adoption of the child by the
stepfather, the only circumstances under which the stepfather could obtain standing to request cus-
tody of the minor was by termination of the natural mother's parental rights. Since the only person
who had standing to bring an action to terminate parental rights was the district attorney, it was
held that the stepfather had no standing to sue for custody of the stepchild). But see N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-13.1 (1984) ("Any parent, relative or other person.., claiming the right to custody of a
minor child may institute an action ... as hereinafter provided.").
38. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9.1.(a) (1982); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (1983); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 93-5-23 (1972).
39. Phillips v. Phillips, 176 Ore. 159, 172, 156 P.2d 199, 203 (1945).
The statute concerning decrees of divorce specifies that the court shall have the power to pro-
vide for the future care and custody of the minor children of the marriage. The children in the
case at bar are not the "children of the marriage" and the statute gives no power to the court to
provide for their custody.
40. Anderson, 191 Kan. at 79, 379 P.2d at 350.
41. Id. at 79, 379 P.2d at 351 (quoting State v. Taylor, 125 Kan. 594, 596, 264 P. 1069, 1070
(1928)).
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torically have been reluctant to disturb the longstanding right of natural
parents to the custody of their minor children as against third parties. At
common law, the natural father had a proprietary right to the custody of
a legitimate minor child which was absolute.'a Gradually, this common
law rule of absolute paternal custody gave way to a preference for the
mother where the child was of a young age. However, this maternal
preference which became known as the "tender years doctrine" came
under increasing attack as being violative of the equal protection
clause.4 3 Partly in response to these challenges, courts began taking a
more facially neutral posture towards custody disputes between natural
parents. They began holding that where both parents were fit and proper
custodians, the custody determination would be based on the best inter-
est of the child. 4
While this "best interest of the child" test is now almost uniformly
applied to custody disputes between natural parents, most courts have
been unwilling to apply this standard to a custody dispute between a
natural parent and a third party. 5 Instead, the courts have used a vari-
ety of approaches in the latter type of dispute which almost invariably
result in an award of custody to the natural parent absent a finding of
unfitness.
Some courts, in deciding disputes between natural parents and third
parties, have strictly adhered to the "parental rights" doctrine. This doc-
trine provides that in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, cus-
tody of a minor child should be given to the natural parent if that parent
is found to be fit.46 In Childs v. Childs, 7 for example, where the juvenile
court awarded custody to the grandparents and the father appealed, the
Supreme Court of Georgia held that "the law contemplates that one of
the natural parents will be awarded custody of the child unless the pres-
ent unfitness of the parents is established by clear and convincing
42. E.g., In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 685, 126 P.2d 765, 771 (1942).
43. See generally State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 180, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 288
(1973) (stating that the trend in legislation, commentary and judicial decisions is away from the
"tender years presumption"); Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981). But see Albright v.
Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983) ("tender years doctrine" reaffirmed).
44. See generally Shumway v. Shumway, 106 Idaho 415, 679 P.2d 1133 (1984); Rizzo v. Rizzo,
95 Ill. App. 3d 636, 420 N.E.2d 555 (1981).
45. See generally Blackburn v. Blackburn, 168 Ga. App. 66, 70, 308 S.E.2d 193, 197 (1983)
(held that between a third party and a natural parent, the natural parent is entitled to custody unless
it is shown that the parent is unfit); Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's
Serv., 237 Ga. 449, 228 S.E.2d 839 (1976). But see Comer v. Comer, 61 N.C. App. 324, 328, 300
S.E.2d 457, 460 (1983) (held that the "trial judge's discretion is such that he is not required to find a
natural parent unfit for custody as a prerequisite to awarding custody to a third person.") (quoting
In re Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App. 364, 368, 246 S.E.2d 45, 47 (1978)).
46. E.g., White v. Bryan, 236 Ga. 349, 223 S.E.2d 710 (1976); Lord v. Lord, 443 N.E.2d 847,
849 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
47. 237 Ga. 177, 227 S.E.2d 49 (1976).
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Some courts have gone so far as to say that the natural parents have a
constitutional right to custody of their minor children and absent com-
pelling reasons, the court is without authority to displace a fit and able
parent in favor of a third party.4 9 However, the authorities relied upon
by these courts, for the most part, involve the termination of parental
rights proceedings.5 0 Custody cases involving natural parents and third
parties can readily be distinguished from those cases involving the termi-
nation of parental rights. The latter cases result in an absolute severance
of ties between the parent and child whereas a custodial, determination
remains modifiable throughout the child's minority. Because of the sub-
stantive differences in the outcome of the two proceedings, it can be ar-
gued that the same constitutional considerations that apply to a parental
rights termination proceeding should not apply to a custody proceeding.
Other courts, while using less direct approaches, effectively reach the
same result as those courts strictly adhering to application of the "paren-
tal rights" doctrine. For example, some courts which appear to be es-
pousing the "best interest of the child" test rather than the "parental
rights" doctrine arrive at the same conclusion one would reach through
the application of the latter doctrine by engaging in a presumption that
the "best interest" of the child will be served by placing custody of that
child with the natural parent absent a finding of unfitness.5 1 For courts
that engage in such a presumption, the focus of the inquiry is a factual
determination of the fitness of the natural parent. If the parent is found
to be fit, no separate inquiries pertaining to the child's interest are made.
Rather, it is presumed at that point that the child's interest will best be
served by leaving custody with the natural parent. Since such a finding is
void of any factual determination of whether it would be best for the
child to be placed elsewhere notwithstanding a finding that the natural
parent is fit, the court's decision is in reality nothing more than a veiled
application of the "parental rights" doctrine.
Some courts go even further and profess to have based their decision
solely on a determination of what would best serve the child's interest
without regard to the rights of the parents. However, a closer examina-
tion of these opinions will more often than not reveal either a finding that
the natural parent was unfit52 or a factual basis5 3 for such a determina-
48. Id. at 178, 277 S.E.2d at 50.
49. Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis. 2d 549, 348 N.W.2d 479 (1984).
50. See, eg., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
51. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977); Plemmons v. Stiles, 65 N.C. App.
341, 309 S.E.2d 504 (1983); cf. Root v. Allen, 151 Colo. 311, 377 P.2d 117 (1962).
52. See, e-g., In re Ewing, 96 Idaho 424, 426, 529 P.2d 1296, 1298 (1974) (natural father found
to have abandoned the child).
53. Alingh v. Alingh, 259 Iowa 219, 144 N.W.2d 134 (1966) (child suffered extensive and se-
vere bodily injuries at hands of mother); New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Serv. v. Torres, 185
11
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tion. In one such case, Clifford v. Woodford,54 the Arizona Supreme
Court, quoting an earlier decision, stated that the 'pole star' by which it
was guided to a decision was the best interest of the child and that the
parents' prima facie right to custody was not unconditional but was one
which gave way to the paramount consideration of the welfare of the
child." In spite of this seemingly wholehearted embracement of the
"best interest of the child" doctrine, the court subsequently stated that
the natural father's relationship with the children was such as to make
him unfit to assume the responsibilities of parenthood.
5 6
To find that it is in the best interest of the child to be removed from the
custody of the natural parent upon a determination that the parent is
unfit is superfluous. The same result would be obtained through a strict
application of the "parental rights" doctrine. A finding that the natural
parent is unfit obviates the necessity of finding that it would be in the best
interest of the child to be removed from the custody of that parent.
Thus, one can be certain that a decision will be based squarely on the best
interest of the child doctrine only where there has been no finding that
the natural parent is unfit.
Although the "parental rights" doctrine and the "best interest of the
child" doctrine are by no means inherently inapposite, there are circum-
stances under which an award of custody to a natural parent based on
parental right considerations may not coincide with that which is in the
best interest of the child. Where these doctrines compel irreconcilable
results, only a minority of courts have placed the interest of the child
above the rights of the natural parent.5  Those few courts that are will-
ing to give paramount consideration to the best interest of the child have
employed a variety of devices, some of which involve the application of
the "parental rights" doctrine. Since this doctrine requires a finding that
the natural parent is unfit before that individual can be deprived of cus-
tody, some courts simply give the term "unfitness" a broad construction
so as to include acts by the natural parent that would not ordinarily
come within the meaning of that term. For example, in In re Cleaves,58
the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court stated that
within judicial definition, an unfit parent includes one who is cruel or
unkind towards his child. 9 In Clifford, the natural father's lack of inter-
est in his children and his indifference towards them was found to be
N.J. Super. 234, 447 A.2d 1372 (1980) (child had suffered extensive bodily injuries at the hands of
the natural parents).
54. 83 Ariz. 257, 320 P.2d 452 (1957).
55. Id. at 264, 320 P.2d at 455.
56. Id. at 266, 320 P.2d at 458.
57. H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS 591 (1968).
58. 6 A.D.2d 138, 175 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1958).
59. Id. at 140, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
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sufficient justification for a finding of unfitness.6" Thus while it is ac-
cepted that acts of abandonment, persistent neglect, and serious physical
harm support a finding of unfitness,6" a liberal construction of the term
"unfitness" to encompass acts of indifference and irresponsibility greatly
enhances the likelihood of a finding that the natural parent is unfit.
Similarly, it is said that a natural parent will only be deprived of cus-
tody if that parent is found to be unfit unless "extraordinary" 62 or "ex-
ceptional"63 circumstances would dictate a contrary result. Although
the employment of this language is clearly intended to cover only ex-
treme situations such as abandonment and lengthy separations, some
courts have liberally construed "extraordinary" or "exceptional" circum-
stances to accommodate the interest of the child within the confines of
the "parental rights" doctrine." Thus, through a broad construction of
statutory terms such as "unfitness" and "extraordinary" circumstances,
some courts have liberalized the circumstances under which a natural
parent may be deprived of the custody of his child in a dispute with a
third party.
C. "Best Interest of the Child" and "Psychological Parentage"
A minority of courts have abandoned the "parental rights" doctrine
altogether in favor of the "best interest of the child" test. The Florida
District Court of Appeal explained its departure from the "parental
rights" doctrine in the following manner.
[T]he ultimate test in determining the custody award should be the best
interest and welfare of the child.... It is true... that courts should not
lightly encroach on the rights of natural parents to have the custody, care
and control of minor children, especially when such parents are found to
be fit ... However, the facts of this case illustrate that there can be
conflicts between what is reasonably perceived by a trial judge to be in
the child's best interests and a natural parent's preferential right to cus-
tody .... 65
In abandoning the "parental rights" doctrine, the various rationales
that have been advanced include the "psychological parentage" theory
which was discussed at length in Doe v. Doe,66 a case involving a step-
mother who sought custody of her husband's two sons, ages sixteen and
60. Clifford, 83 Ariz. at 266, 320 P.2d at 458.
61. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976).
62. Id.
63. Daley v. Gunville, 348 N.W.2d 441, 443 (N.D. 1984).
64. Id. at 443-44 (the court said that in a custody dispute between a natural mother and a
grandmother, "exceptional circumstances" warranting a deprivation of custody by the natural par-
ent existed where the custody dispute pitted "psychological parent against the natural parent")
(quoting In re D.R.J., 317 N.W.2d 391, 394 (N.D. 1982)).
65. Gorman v. Gorman, 400 So. 2d 75, 77-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
66. 92 Misc. 2d 184, 399 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1977).
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fifteen. It was noted there that the presumption favoring the natural
parent should be rebuttable where the child has developed a secure, sta-
ble, and continuing parent/child relationship with a third party who has
become a psychological parent. The rationale for continuing the rela-
tionship is that disruption tf the relationship with the third party could
be even more traumatic and devastating than severing the ties between
the child and the natural parent.6" In Doe, the New York Supreme
Court placed custody of the boys with the stepmother based in part on
the close ties that they had developed and the testimony from the boys
that they wished to remain with their stepmother as opposed to their
natural father.
The "psychological parentage" theory which has been successfully as-
serted by grandparents and foster parents has gained increasing accept-
ance by the courts in recent years.68 The significance of this theory for
stepparents is that it compels recognition of familial bonding between
persons who are not biologically related and thereby places those step-
parents who are able to demonstrate the requisite psychological ties with
the stepchild on a more equal footing with the natural parent in a custo-
dial dispute.
The most significant implication of the departure from the "parental
rights" doctrine is that the stepparent may be entitled to custody of the
child absent a finding that the natural parent is unfit. In Cebrzynski v.
Cebrzynski,6 9 a case which involved a custody dispute between a natural
mother and a stepmother following the death of the child's natural fa-
ther, the stepmother was awarded custody of the child even though the
natural mother was found to be fit. In that case, the trial judge was
presented with testimony that the child had been living with the step-
mother for three and one half years and it would be emotionally damag-
ing to the child to change custody to the natural mother.7 °
In the Gorman v. Gorman71 decision, a Florida District Court of Ap-
peal awarded custody of the husband's thirteen year old son to the step-
mother even though the husband was found to be a fit and proper
custodian.7" Gorman is one of the most significant decisions to date on
the issue of custody between a natural parent and a stepparent. The
court there not only awarded custody to the stepparent in the absence of
67. Id. at 192, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 982; see also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD (1973).
68. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (where foster families
asserted a liberty interest in foster children placed in their care based on "psychological ties" with
the children, the Court noted that biological relationships are not the exclusive determination of
family).
69. 63 Ill. App. 3d 66, 379 N.E.2d 713 (1978).
70. Id.
71. 400 So. 2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
72. Id. at 77.
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a determination that the natural parent was unfit, it also made the award
of custody to the stepparent even though the child had continuously re-
sided with both the stepparent and the natural parent. In the other cases
where the stepparent was awarded custody over the natural parent ab-
sent a finding of unfitness, the child had not resided with the natural
parent for some period of time.7" In Gorman, the child's natural mother
had died in childbirth and the child had resided with the stepmother
since he was less than a year old. The child was unaware that the step-
mother was not his natural mother until he was approximately ten years
old. Although the natural father had continuously resided with the child
and was not found to be unfit, it was clear that the child had developed a
much closer relationship with the stepmother. The judge in Gorman
aptly summed up his position when he stated that "this case demon-
strates that in a given case a child can be better loved and cared for by a
'stranger' than by its own natural parent."74
D. In Loco Parentis
Thus, stepparents have progressed from having virtually no chance of
being awarded custody of a stepchild at common law to having an oppor-
tunity sometimes equaling that of the natural parent. This reversal, how-
ever, has occurred in only a handful of cases to date where the courts
have been willing to apply the "best interest of the child" test to a cus-
tody dispute between a stepparent and a natural parent. For the most
part, stepparents continue to be thwarted in their efforts by the applica-
tion of the "parental rights" doctrine.
Where courts continue to apply the "parental rights" doctrine, those
stepparents who are seeking custody of a stepchild against a noncustodial
natural parent are generally in a more favorable position than steppar-
ents who are seeking custody against a custodial natural parent. The
factor which weighs most heavily in favor of the stepparent in the former
situation is that in many instances the noncustodial parent has not main-
tained close ties with the child and the stepparent is therefore in a better
position to allege that the child has been abandoned by the natural parent
and that the natural parent is unfit by reason of neglect and failure to
support the child.75 On the other hand, where the contest is between the
stepparent and the custodial natural parent, grounds for alleging neglect
and abandonment will often be nonexistent. The only recourse for the
stepparent may be an attempt to persuade the court to read the term
73. See, eg., Cebrzynski, 63 Ill. App. 3d at 72-73, 379 N.E.2d at 718.
74. Gorman, 400 So. 2d at 78. But see, Pape v. Pape, 444 So. 2d 1058, 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (The court noted that the physical possession by a stepparent does not in itself furnish grounds
for permanent deprivation of parental custody.).
75. See generally In re Ewing, 96 Idaho 424, 427, 529 P.2d 1296, 1299 (1974); Doe v. Doe, 92
Misc. 2d 184, 399 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1977).
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"unfitness" broadly enough to include acts of unkindness and indiffer-
ence towards the child-acts that would not be enough for the court to
make a determination of unfitness under normal circumstances.76
While the purpose of the "best interest of the child" doctrine is not to
equate the custodial rights of the stepparent with those of the natural
parent, the effect of the doctrine's application is to place the stepparent
on a more equal footing with the natural parent. The stepparent's
strongest argument in a custodial dispute with the natural parent is the
application of the "best interest of the child" doctrine since it focuses the
court's attention on the needs of the child rather than on the status of the
parties.
Where the court is unwilling to accept this argument on its face, an
alternative approach which has not yet been vigorously pursued within
the context of a custody dispute is the assertion of in loco parentis status.
This doctrine goes even further than the "best interest of the child" doc-
trine in equating the rights of stepparents with those of natural parents.
The courts may, however, be more receptive to an argument based on in
loco parentis because of their longstanding recognition of the doctrine
and familiarity with its application, albeit under different circumstances.
Based on past decisions, it would appear that where the stepparent can
establish that he accepted the child into the family unit and participated
in the child's support, education and upbringing, the stepparent should
be considered as being in loco parentis with the child. Moreover, the in
loco parentis status has been said to confer rights and liabilities upon the
stepparents akin to those of a natural parent." Since this doctrine is
being relied upon with increasing frequency to impose obligations of sup-
port against stepparents, the corresponding rights associated with the
doctrine should also be made equally available to the stepparent, namely,
a right of custody of the stepchild that equates with the right of the natu-
ral parent.7 8
A major drawback to the application of the in loco parentis doctrine,
within the context of a custodial dispute, is that in loco parentis status
historically has been terminated upon a divorce by the parties. The ap-
plication of the doctrine under these circumstances would compel an ex-
tension of the status beyond the dissolution of the marriage. However,
76. See, e.g., Daley v. Gunville, 348 N.W.2d 441, 443 (N.D. 1984).
77. See generally Austin v. Austin, 147 Neb. 109, 112-13, 22 N.W.2d 560, 563 (1946); Sparks v.
Hinckley, 78 Utah 502, 5 P.2d 570 (1931); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 673, 693-94, 126 P.2d 765, 775
(1942) ("parents or those standing in locoparentis to minor children primarily have the constitutional
right to the custody and control of such minor children.. .") (emphasis added). But see Berkowitz,
supra note 32, at 213.
78. See Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1978) (in a proceeding by a stepparent to
establish visitation rights, the court noted that in loco parentis does not envision that a stepparent be
permitted to enjoy the rights of a natural parent without also accepting the responsibilities that are
incurred).
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where the status has been said to terminate upon the dissolution of the
marriage, the question of termination has arisen within the context of a
support proceeding where the stepparent was seeking the termination in
order to avoid support liabilities towards the stepchild.79 To the extent
that the status is one that can be voluntarily terminated by the steppar-
ent, it should follow that where the stepparent chooses not to terminate
the in loco parentis status, he can retain the status beyond the dissolution
of the marriage.80 In addition, ample precedent for the continuation of
the status beyond the dissolution of the marriage has been established in
the support cases on the theory of equitable estoppel.81
Assuming that the stepparent can successfully argue for the applica-
tion of the in loco parentis doctrine, courts should be led to an applica-
tion of the "best interest of the child" test. If this test is applied in
disputes between natural parents who stand on equal footing, it arguably
should apply to a dispute between a natural parent and a stepparent who
has in loco parentis status since the stepparent, by virtue of such status,
legally stands in the place of the natural parent.
VISITATION PRIVILEGES
Stepparents seeking to establish visitation privileges with stepchildren
have fared much better overall than those asserting custodial rights. This
is largely due to the fact that an award of visitation as compared to an
award of custody impacts to a lesser extent on the natural parent's au-
thority and control over the child. An award of visitation to the steppar-
ent results in a temporary interference with the natural parent's custody
and control of the child whereas an award of custody to the stepparent is
a much more substantial interruption of the relationship between the nat-
ural parent and her child. Consequently, a court that is reluctant to
award custody of a child to a stepparent may be much more receptive to
granting the stepparent visitation privileges with the child.
However, even where the courts are amenable to granting visitation
privileges to stepparents, such privileges may not be equated with those
of the natural parent. The Virginia Code, for example, provides that a
court may make such decree as it deems proper for "visitation rights of
the parents and visitation privileges for the grandparents, stepparents or
other family members."82 In addition, where grandparents have success-
79. See, e.g., Franklin v. Franklin, 75 Ariz. 151, 155-56, 253 P.2d 337, 340 (1953).
80. See Gribble, 583 P.2d at 67 (stating that the common law concerning termination of the in
loco parentis status is that only the surrogate parent or the child is able to terminate the status at
will, and the rights, duties and obligations continue as long as they choose to continue the relation-
ship) (footnote omitted).
81. See generally Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351 (1984); Ross v. Ross, 126 N.J.
Super. 394, 314 A.2d 623 (1973).
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (1983) (emphasis added).
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fully asserted a right to visit with grandchildren, this "right" is often
contingent upon the occurrence of certain events such as death or di-
vorce of their child.83 Moreover, the "right" to visitation may be termi-
nated upon the adoption of the grandchild.84
In some instances, courts have denied visitation privileges to third par-
ties altogether upon objection to such visitation by the custodial parent."
Where this has occurred, the courts have reasoned that the natural par-
ents have a prima facie right to uninterrupted custody of their children
which must be overcome by the third party's assertion of visitation
rights.86 This type of reasoning by the courts reflects an implicit recogni-
tion of the "parental rights" doctrine which would require deference to
the wishes of the natural parent absent exceptional circumstances.
Notwithstanding these historical and, in some cases, present restric-
tions on visitation privileges by third parties, the trend is definitely to-
wards liberalization of third party visitation privileges. For example, an
examination of those cases denying visitation rights to third parties out-
right reveals that the contest was often between a grandparent and a nat-
ural parent prior to the enactment of a grandparent visitation statute.
The court was usually deferring to the "rights" of the natural parent in
denying the grandparent visitation rights. The precedential value of
these cases has since been diminished in a majority of jurisdictions by the
enactment of grandparent visitation statutes.87 In addition, the contest
between the grandparent and the natural parent can be distinguished
from the contest between the stepparent and the natural parent. In the
former the grandparent was often refused visitation rights because he was
unable to establish that a substantial relationship existed with the
grandchild.88 In the latter case, the dispute arises within the context of a
custody or habeas corpus proceeding and the stepparent, who generally
has physical custody of the child, has little difficulty establishing the
existence of close ties with the child.
83. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01 (West 1986):
The court may... award reasonable rights of visitation to grandparents with respect to the
child when it is in the best interest of the minor child if: (a) One or both parents of the child are
deceased; (b) The marriage of the parents... has dissolved; or (c) A parent has deserted the
child ....
See also IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.7.2 (West Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (1984).
84. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.07 (West 1986). Some states distinguish between an adop-
tion of the child by a stepparent and an adoption of the child by a "stranger," terminating the
grandparents' visitation in the latter adoption but not the former. See, eg., In re Adoption of Schu-
macher, 120 Ill. App. 3d 50, 458 N.E.2d 94 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.5 (1984); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 30-6-301 (1984). But see Smith v. Finstad, 247 Ga. 603, 277 S.E.2d 736 (1981).
85. See Veazey v. Stewart, 251 Ark. 334, 472 S.W.2d 102 (1971). But see Collins v. Gilbreath,
403 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
86. Commonwealth ex rel Williams v. Miller, 254 Pa. Super. 227, 385 A.2d 992 (1978).
87. 1985 Survey of American Family Law, I1 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3020 (May 7, 1985).
88. See, e.g., Veazey, 251 Ark. at 334, 572 S.W.2d at 102.
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In some instances, the stepparent's efforts to obtain visitation privi-
leges are facilitated by the presence of statutes which provide for third
party visitation. 9 At least one statute expressly grants visitation to step-
parentsY0 Where there is no statute in force that is worded broadly
enough to encompass stepparent visitation, those statutes that grant visi-
tation rights specifically to grandparents have been the subject of argu-
ments both for and against stepparent visitation.
For instance, in Evans v. Evans,91 where a stepparent was seeking visi-
tation privileges, it was argued that the amendment of the statute to in-
clude visitation by grandparents evidenced a legislative intent to limit
visitation to a class of persons consisting of parents and grandparents
only. The Maryland Supreme Court noted, however, that the statutory
provisions in effect before the amendment constituted a broad grant of
authority to courts to determine who should be awarded visitation rights
and concluded that the legislature did not intend in any way to limit this
authority by amendment. 92
While it was asserted in Evans that the statute should be narrowly
construed to limit visitation to grandparents, it can be persuasively ar-
gued that grandparent visitation statutes are indicative of a legislative
recognition of circumstances which warrant the granting of visitation
privileges to persons other than the natural parents. It can also be ar-
gued that those same circumstances, namely consideration of the child's
welfare, compel an extension of visitation privileges to stepparents.
B. Best Interest of the Child" and In Loco Parentis as a Basis for
Visitation Rights
Some courts that hold that a stepparent has no right to visitation with
a stepchild solely on the basis of his status as a stepparent will allow the
visitation if the stepparent can establish that he stands in loco parentis
with the child.93 In Gribble v. Gribble94 the Utah Supreme Court con-
cluded that if nothing more than the step relationship existed, the step-
parent had no standing to assert a right of visitation, but then proceeded
to hold that the stepparent was entitled to an opportunity to establish
89. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (West 1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (1983); WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.09.240 (1986).
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (1983) ("upon decreeing the dissolution of a marriage... the
court may make such ... decree as it shall deem expedient ... concerning visitation rights for
grandparents, stepparents, or other family members..
91. 302 Md. 334, 488 A.2d 157 (1985).
92. Id. at 339, 488 A.2d at 161.
93. Bryan v. Bryan, 132 Ariz. 353, 359, 645 P.2d 1267, 1273 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Carter v.
Broderick, 644 P.2d 850, 853 (Alaska 1982).
94. 583 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1978).
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that he stood in loco parentis with the child. Assuming then, that a step-
parent can establish that he stands in loco parentis with the stepchild,
this status should entitle the stepparent to visitation on the theory that
this status places the stepparent in the same position as the natural par-
ent vis-a-vis the child.
Absent statutory authority and the ability to establish an in loco
parentis relationship, the stepparent can resort to the "best interest of the
child" doctrine. The utility of this assertion for the stepparent is that it
focuses the court's attention on the needs and concerns of the child
rather than the status of the stepparent with the result that the signifi-
cance of the natural parent's biological ties to the child are diminished
and the stepparent's psychological ties to the child are enhanced.
In general, where stepparents have asserted rights of visitation with a
stepchild absent explicit statutory authority, courts have been amenable
to granting such visitation on a theory of in loco parentis or "best interest
of the child." As stepparents become more persistent in asserting their
rights of visitation, legislatures that have not already done so, are apt to
respond by revising visitation statutes to specifically include stepparent
visitation as Virginia95 has done, or to include third party visitation
which would be inclusive of stepparents as California96 and Washing-
ton97 have done. Having granted such visitation privileges to grandpar-
ents on the theory that it would be in the best interest of the child, it
would be difficult to rationalize a retreat from this position as it relates to
a stepparent's right of visitation.
CONCLUSION
Although stepparents had no rights and obligations towards stepchil-
dren at common law, as a result of judicial and statutory changes, step-
parents today can assert rights of custody and visitation and likewise can
be held liable for the support of a stepchild. While in some cases, the
stepparent's rights and liabilities are created by virtue of his status as
such, in most instances, something more than one's status as a stepparent
is required in order to confer rights and impose liabilities. The doctrine
under which stepparents most often acquire rights and incur obligations
towards a stepchild by virtue of their conduct is the in loco parentis
doctrine.
With respect to custody actions and visitation, the in loco parentis
doctrine is potentially the most significant for the stepparent, in that it
has been said to give one who attains that status the same rights and
obligations as the natural parent. In practice, however, the courts have
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (1983).
96. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 4601 (West 1983).
97. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (1986).
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not, in fact, equated the rights and obligations of the stepparent with
those of the natural parent in absolute fashion even when applying the in
loco parentis doctrine. In the support area, for example, a natural parent
is required to support a child both during and after the marriage, while a
stepparent, even if required to support the child during the marriage by
virtue of an in loco parentis status, will not be required to support the
child beyond the marriage absent some further conduct by the stepparent
that would warrant imposition of equitable estoppel. Because the step-
parent's obligations have not yet been fully equated with those of the
natural parent in support cases, the argument that in loco parentis com-
pels equal treatment in the areas of custody and visitation is substantially
weakened.
Thus, until the in loco parentis doctrine is applied in a manner so as to
absolutely equate the rights and liabilities of the stepparents with those of
the natural parent, the most important doctrine for the stepparent in cus-
tody and visitation actions is the "best interest of the child" doctrine.
Here, the stepparent is, in effect, given the same treatment as the natural
parent, not because the stepparent is said to have rights equaling those of
the natural parent, but because the court is only concerned with the in-
terest of the child. Moreover, given that the trend, however slow, is
away from and not towards the application of the "parental rights" doc-
trine, the "best interest of the child" doctrine should continue to be one
of the most significant forces behind the equation of the stepparent's po-
sition with that of the natural parent in custody cases.
In support actions, in loco parentis and equitable estoppel remain the
most forceful arguments for the imposition of support liabilities against
the stepparent that equate with those of the natural parent. In both cus-
tody and support actions, it is anticipated that the continued shifting of
emphasis from "parental rights" to the "best interests of the child" doc-
trine will result in an increasing number of decisions that obscure the
distinction between stepparents and natural parents in the "blended
family."
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